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 INTRODUCTION
The organisers of the conference suggested that the 1992 keynote speaker
address the challenge of "putting transport planning into practice". In considering
this topic, I asked the pre-question: "what are the key challenges facing transport
planners in being relevant?". The risk of a pre-occupation with responding to the
requests for  planning to satisfy the immediate needs of today tend often to
narrowly focus the debate. The important questions are: "what are desirable futures?"
and "how do we get there?".
In my paper I set out what I believe are some major themes which transport planners
should address as part of the procedure for developing a strategic view of the future.
Determining what is desirable is a great challenge. We have few (agreed) guidelines.
What we do have however are at least two very powerful forces at play in the form of
markets and institutional regulation. At the heart of the debate on a desirable future is a
consideration of the trade-off between the role of the market and the role of non-market
controls.  Complicating this trade-off is the resolution of the question "how good a guide
is the past in identifying the ideals of the future?". The arguments developed in this paper
are based on the premiss that the principles enunciated in the past still hold, but the
practice has not served us well enough. An example is the breakdown of efficient price
signals, designed to recognise the full set of social costs of transport provision in order
to focus the decisions of individuals on choices and outcomes which are consistent with
the aggregate good of society.
The full set of social costs and benefits in the transport planning context manifest
themselves most clearly in the challenges now focussed on the interplay between land
use and travel, especially in metropolitan areas. Historically we have acknowledged the
importance of considering the land use implications of transport decisions, and vice
versa. But have we advanced our knowledge to a position where we can answer the
question on what land use patterns change urban travel, be it a reduction or an increase
in travel? The failure to unambiguously answer this question  may be due to the lack of a
relationship which is not directly causal. An intervening influence on both land use and
travel is the behaviour of individuals (and firms) that affects the demand  for land use and
travel. The recognition of this paradigm, as simple and intuitive as it is, refocusses the
debate on the power of the consumer, the role of markets, and the need/desire for
choice. Individuals have information about a set of opportunities to engage in activities
at various locations, some of which will involve travel. The individual also has needs to
work, shop, have a home and a particular lifestyle. These needs condition how the
individual chooses among activity opportunities involving travel. The individual also has
resources such as time and money that affect response to opportunities to travel and
location of activities at various places and prices.
Thus individuals respond to opportunities, needs and resources to consume both land
(location) and travel.  The set of market signals and institutional regulations (e.g.
subsidies to particular modes) in the past have tended in general to create a "market" in
which travel is inexpensive relative to housing such that one can acquire more house per
dollar farther from the centre, creating an incentive for low density living (Deakin 1991).
We should not use this evidence to conclude that the observed outcome is undesirable
per se. We can certainly conclude that it is not necessarily an efficient outcome. We can
say this because unquestionably societies have failed to establish efficient prices for
location and travel, including a recognition of the environmental and social costs
associated with alternative bundles of land use and travel. The establishment of
appropriate (social) prices will within a society of significant variations in individual
wealth produce a continuum of land use/travel bundles, accommodating the preferences
of individuals for high-density/low travel requirements through to low density/high travel
requirements. Low density/low travel requirements can also be included in the set, as
exemplified by the decentralisation of workplaces and opportunities to reduce the
commuting time while choosing a low-density residential location. The statement "I'll
have mine medium rural please " should sit comfortable next to "I'll have mine well-done
central please"! (Peiser 1989, Hensher 1992).
THE ROLE OF MARKETS: THE  TRADITIONAL ECONOMIST MAY HAVE
A LOT TO ANSWER FOR!
Transport planners are increasingly recognising that market forces have a powerful
influence on the supply of transport infrastructure and the associated use of such
facilities (Richmond 1991). The role of government is increasingly under scrutiny, as
witnessed by the high-agenda debate on privatisation, economic deregulation and
competitive tendering (Hensher and Beesley 1992, Beesley et.al. 1992). A commonly
levelled criticism of markets is that they fail in a number of ways and that government
must be responsible for correcting the incentives of the market  (e.g. the imposition of
minimum levels of service under the 1990 NSW Passenger Transport Act) or to replace
the market entirely (e.g. Publicly provided bus services with a spatial monopoly).
The economist educated in the post-war period has in many ways misled the transport
planner into a potentially false belief of the role of government (and its great reliance on
formal planning procedures). The mainstrean paradigm tends  to see the economic
problem facing society as one of efficiently allocating scarce resources in the light of
individual preferences, techniques and resource availabilities, knowledge of which is
supposed somehow to be giv n.  This paradigm neglects the importance of the
discovery of these preferences, techniques and resource availabilities.  This difference in
emphasis leads to alternative interpretations of the role of government. The accepted
mainstream wisdom in welfare economics  asks whether the market provides the right
incentives to allocate resources efficiently. Where it does not they see the case for
government to correct the incentives or to replace the market. The alternative view
(known as the Austrian view) asks whether the market provides the right incentives to
discover where there is scope for increased coordination leading to mprovements in the
allocation of resources. It is acknowledged that the market  makes mistakes, but on the
whole it is concluded that the government cannot hope to acquire sufficient information
to do a better job. Market failure or government failure - the best of two bads?
The challenge then becomes one of identifying what kind of government policies provide
the most encouragement for the coordinating process of the market.  The mainstream
interpretation has seen the requirement for institutions such as the Prices Justification
Tribunal, the Trade Practices Commission, cost-benefit analysis and environmental
impact statements, as devices to correct "market failure" and improve resource
allocation. By contrast the Austrian perspective sees these institutions as more likely to
impede the process of coordination. The emphasis is moved to the importance of
freedom of entry and the development of private property rights as means to encourage
the smooth functioning of markets and the competitive process and thereby to protect
the public from exploitation and inefficiency, not only from monopoly but also from
unnecessary government.  Indeed this begs the question: would we have such low
density urban areas if public transport was efficiently priced and not nationalised in the
central areas of capital cities, and road pricing was in place?  The value of subsidised
public transport for the common good of the environment may  be a fallacy (Hensher
and Milthorpe 1989, Beesley 1991).
How then do we suggest to government and planners who advise them that it is time to
recast the dice. The central issue is a recognition that governments will respond to
political pressures. It cannot be assumed that the use of techniques such as cost-benefit
analysis and externality (Pigovian) taxes will ensure the remedy of externalities in the
manner assumed by welfare economists and transport planners. Taking a step
backwards, we must recognise that the task is not primarily one of computing the
optimal solution to a well-defined "problem", but rather one of discovering the problem
in the first place There is not enough consideration given to good ideas; where this does
occur they are increasingly being stifled by debates on intellectual property rights and the
desire of governments to put private ideas out to public tender.   Having identified a
problem and a possibility of making some improvement, necessary information is
gathered and analysed within a process which moves forward to implementation of an
improved solution.
The important question becomes: what kind of institutional framework is most likely to
promote the discovery of activities with significant externalities and to resolve them with
minimum cost and maximum benefit?. Will complaints from individuals and lobby groups
(potentially) affected by a new tolled freeway be sufficient to alert the appropriate
government authority, or is the prospect of paying and receiving damages more likely to
spur the parties to agreement?  How will the information necessary to reach an efficient
solution be obtained?  In the market, negotiations take place between parties who act in
accordance with their own preferences and opportunities they believe open to them. In a
public inquiry and cost-benefit analysis or a setting of establishing externality taxes, a
major difficulty is that these preferences must be estimated. If a lobby group has to
"purchase" the right to prevent open space being developed for a freeway, this action
will reveal the value placed on this "commodity".
What incentives do individuals involved in the process have to implement the solution
thought to be most efficient? In the market the incentive is "private" gain (liberally
interpreted to accommodate the gain of members of a lobby group who see the gains to
them being gains to society). In a bureaucracy other incentives and pressures take
precedence. For political reasons, it is unlikely that the recommendations of a cost-
benefit analysis will be unhesitatingly accepted or that an externality tax (e.g. congestion
tax, environmental levy) will be imposed at the rate calculated as optimal. Governments
tend to attach political significance to the outcomes of various alternatives which is often
different to that of the inquiring Commissioner and probably different from the view
which consumers would have expressed in the market. The Kyeemagh-Chullora Road
Royal Commission  (Hensher et.al. 1983) and the Castlereagh Freeway - F2 inquiry  are
two examples of such outcomes.  Politicians are in office to respond to public pressures,
not to ignore them.
Given that governments will ultimately respond to political pressures and that inquiries,
cost-benefit analysis, externality taxes etc. are unlikely to produce the outcomes which
such tools generate, it may be better to look elsewhere for "planning solutions". An
appealing paradigm is that of the creation of appropriate property rights within which the
market operates  more efficiently.  If providers were held legally liable for damages
caused by their actions, they would have to take these damages into account without any
government intervention. The need for appropriate incent ves and sanctions is at the
heart of the problem of implementation. Indeed, it has been argued by Coase (1959) that
property rights were beginning to emerge and would have evolved into an efficient
market in radio broadcasting in the USA had not the government intervened to prevent
it.
TRANSPORTATION AND LAND USE CONTROLS FROM THE
PERSPECTIVE OF PRIVATISATION AND MARKETS: A PARTICULAR
CHALLENGE
Despite the acknowledged primary relationship between transport and land use, its
systematic observation and analysis have remained secondary.  This has been due, in
part, to the difficulties involved such as the variety of institutional settings and
regulations in which land use planning and zoning is done, and their immense political
sensitivity.
One way to pay for transport facilities is from the benefits accruing to land owners in
the form of 'impact fees' assessed on developers at the time of issuing building permits.
In return the city (or a government entity) obligates itself to building a particular facility
within a specified time or to refund the money.  They introduce a private instrument in
planning for growth but are limited in scope and effect. In spite of the recognition of
externalities, impact fees do not affect the planning of major transport arterials, which is
a government function.  Governments regard them as a tax to be raised to help finance
roads which are already on the planning books.
Why has the planning process failed to deal effectively with both negative and positive
externalities of transportation? This is despite the planners' rational approach:  define,
quantify and predict them, avoid or ameliorate them by means of planning and
technology, gauge monetary values for them in order to compensate harm, internalise
them in a benefit-cost calculus, and engage in participatory planning to gain agreement
on a course of action to be implemented.
Since the freeway revolt in the early 70's, the planning process and procedures have
been fragile and vulnerable to challenge.  Using both the planning process and the court
system the interests representing negative externalities have been successful in vetoing,
delaying, shelving, but also improving the planned facilities. The dilemmas effected by
negative (and positive) externalities are exacerbated, and some would say caused, by the
lack of markets for them.  The central issues concern both equity and values:  in what
form (e.g. money; personal, local and global health effects; values such as aesthetics or
historical preservation, etc.), when, and who suffer the consequences?  An unintended
by-product of the well-intended comprehensiveness of planning has been its
bureaucratisation and inefficiency.  In order to satisfy planning requirements a transport
planner has to cover issues from design standards and travel demands to preservation of
threatened species and historical landmarks.
How, then should planning be organised so as to be relevant to individuals' decisions
and choices? In particular, could internalisation of the externalities and 'market place'-
type decision making be accomplished by privatising planning?  If privatisation of
planning is desirable, in what kind of institutional framework should it operate?  What
issues, if any, should be left for the government? Economic markets have proved
remarkably effective in providing people with the goods and services they desire.  Land
use and transport planning have faltered in accounting for externalities; government
policy instruments designed to correct for them are causing unaffordability of housing
and transportation. An important question is:  because public planning seems to fail, can
internalisation of externalities and affordability of housing and transportation be
accomplished by privatising planning ?
THE BEST OF TWO EVILS?
If we accept the view that markets often fail and governments also often fail, and that
market failure may be less harmful than government failure, then we have to identify
institutional reforms which will oversee the elimination of market failure.  Abandoning
government inquiries does not mean that externalities will be ignored. Private property
rights have to be better defined and enforced, so that these less tangible goods can be
transacted in the market.  If a developer has to compensate local residents for loss of
amenity, it is much more likely that if the residents accept the compensation, they are
revealing a reservation and market price for this "good". Part of this process of
establishing property rights recognises the willingness and ability of environmental
groups to raise sufficient funds to protect the environment, or persuade taxpayers to do
so. A failure to do so would indicate that a particular environmental concern is a
minority interest. An environmental trust akin to the National heritage trust could
evolve.
Inevitably, interest groups would still argue that government has a role to ensure that the
environment is protected. The response here is: we all have a role to see that the
environment is protected and that a reliance on government is a failure to establish
appropriate property rights, incentives and sanctions. Society has to be extremely careful
that in giving government too much influence on the state of our nation that we are
straight-jacketing our prospects for progress. We are where we are primarily because we
did not attempt to plan it or subject it to any central direction, but left it to be guided by
a spontaneous ordering mechanism, or a self-generating order (Hayek 1976). The role of
government has historically been modest: to assi  the forces of markets in the context
of appropriate property rights. The challenge for the future is to assist the market rather
than contribute to forces of resistance. This calls for an independent planning regulator,
along the lines of the independent regulators set up in Britain for telecommunications
(OFTEL), gas (OFGAS) etc.  The combination of a legal system and the
independent  regulator is designed to create opportunities for market
participation, using a managed competitive planning policy. The regulatory task
embraces  the notion of a "cost-benefit analysis on behalf of society" where the
arguments are approached by the traditional economic response of efficient allocation of
resources in line with a commitment to the consumer interest.
While this umpiring role is desirable, we acknowledge the political problem of
democracy. Even if all individuals as consumers stand to gain from a general policy of
non-intervention, each individual as employee or investor stands to gain from par icul r
interventions; and as long as government is responsible to electors within a tight
response period, so long will organised lobby-groups be able to impose their will.
CONCLUSION
Transport planning in the nineties and beyond will face the challenge of the market. It is
true that new skills of a formal kind will be required - everyone needs better information
- however there is a quite revolution taking place which should if it matures place a
greater onus on the planning community to be more imaginative ("entrepreneurial") in
the way it studies the future. There needs to be increased advocacy for policy - to not
unwittingly add grounds for rejection of an alternative but to shift the burden of proof to
a continuum of alternatives. The emphasis then moves to identifying what instruments
can achieve similar ends, by beginning with a selection of current planning concerns,
setting up rival instruments and letting an alternative emerge as the outstanding
performer.
There is a need to stop "preparing to fight the last war or the last trend" but to
understand the implications of alternative futures based on a stronger role of markets
(especially the role of socially desirable price signals in particular for promoting efficient
use of existing investment and in establishing markets for new investment), property
rights, independent regulators and modest government interference. Hopefully what
should emerge is a more useful debate on the relationship between urban form, urban
density, the role of all forms of public transport, infrastructure needs, transport pricing,
and the structure of transport agencies. Transport planning in a free market is not a
contradiction of terms.
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